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NOT ALL STATISTICS ARE CREATED EQUAL 
D. James Greiner∗ 
Replying to Steven L. Willborn & Ramona L. Paetzold, Statistics Is a 
Plural Word, 122 HARV. L. REV. F.  48 (2009), http://www.harvardlaw 
review.org/media/pdf/willborn_paetzold.pdf. 
 
Dean Steven Willborn and Professor Ramona Paetzold have writ-
ten a thought-provoking response1 to my article, Causal Inference in 
Civil Rights Litigation (“Causal Inference”).2  There is much common 
ground among us: All proof of causation, including especially statistic-
al proof in the civil rights litigation context, is “messy, indirect, uncer-
tain, and subject to varying interpretations.”3  Any use of statistics is 
“part art, part science,”4 requires “discretion and judgment”5 as well as 
“complicated (and potentially controversial) choices,”6 and relies on a 
“host of underlying assumptions.”7  Direct evidence (assuming this 
term to be well defined in civil rights) of discrimination is rarely avail-
able,8 and statistical proof should not be held to higher standards than 
nonstatistical proof.9  The conceptualization of discrimination should 
not be limited to “conscious” discrimination (again, to the extent that 
this term is well defined).10  Dean Willborn and Professor Paetzold’s 
Response, Statistics Is a Plural Word (“Plural”), thus makes clear the 
extent of our agreement. 
Plural also makes clear our disagreements, and in doing so, illus-
trates many of the reasons why potential outcomes is a superior ap-
proach to regression as the latter is currently used in civil rights litiga-
tion.  Statistics is a plural word, but not all statistics are created equal. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  Ph.D., Department of Statistics, Harvard 
University, 2007; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1995.  My sincere thanks to Jamie 
Lynn Dodge for providing feedback on this reply.  As usual, all mistakes are my own. 
  1  Steven L. Willborn & Ramona L. Paetzold, Statistics Is a Plural Word, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 48 (2009), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/willborn_paetzold.pdf. 
  2  D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation,  122 H ARV.  L.  REV.  533 
(2008). 
  3  Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 48. 
  4  Id. at 56. 
  5  Id. at 55. 
  6  Id. at 51. 
  7  Id. at 56. 
  8  Id. at 59. 
  9  Id. at 60. 
  10  Id. at 59 n.40.   
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I proceed by posing two questions that allow me to discuss the bulk 
of my disagreement with Dean Willborn and Professor Paetzold.  First, 
what is a causal effect?  Second, how should we think about character-
izing and selecting variables?  I conclude with some additional points. 
I.  WHAT IS A CAUSAL EFFECT? 
A primary theme of Causal Inference was that a coherent frame-
work for causation in the civil rights litigation context should begin by 
identifying the goal of the inference.  We should know exactly what we 
want from a statistical analysis before we begin crunching numbers.  
Section I.C of Causal Inference demonstrated how many of the prob-
lems associated with regression as it is currently used in civil rights lit-
igation stem from a failure to begin with a definition of a causal ef-
fect.11  Part II of Causal Inference showed how, in contrast, the 
potential outcomes framework does begin with such a definition, and 
how much follows naturally from there.12 
In defending regression as it is currently used in civil rights litiga-
tion, Dean Willborn and Professor Paetzold “agree wholehearted-
ly . . . that statistical evidence must be ‘honed by an insistence on a  
definition of a causal effect.’”13  Given this agreement, and given the 
centrality of this point to Causal Inference, one might expect to find a 
definition of a causal effect in Plural, or a citation to the regression lit-
erature containing one.  No such definition appears.  The closest thing 
to such a definition occurs when Dean Willborn and Professor Paet-
zold discuss what regression “produces” in a gender discrimination 
lawsuit: “a coefficient for sex that is either significant or not.”14  The 
singular, “a coefficient,” is not accidental, and it is telling.  As Part I of 
Causal Inference explained, implicit in a definition of a causal effect in 
terms of a single regression coefficient are a host of unrealistic, unde-
sirable, and unnecessary assumptions, including especially the idea 
that being perceived to be female hurts an upper-level manager the 
same as a file clerk, in the teeth of experimental, experiential, and 
judicial evidence to the contrary.15 
The failure to begin with a definition of a causal effect (or, alterna-
tively, the use of a definition based on a single regression coefficient) 
infects much of Plural’s subsequent discussion.  For example, Dean 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  11 Greiner,  supra note 2, at 556–57. 
  12  Specifically, a causal effect is a comparison (often a difference, meaning a subtraction) be-
tween the value of some outcome variable (such as salary) as actually observed and the counter-
factual value that outcome variable would have taken had a woman been perceived to be a man, 
an African American perceived to be white, and so on.  See id. at 558–59. 
  13  Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 56 (quoting Greiner, supra note 2, at 543). 
  14  Id. at 59. 
  15  See Greiner, supra note 2, at 548–51.   
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Willborn and Professor Paetzold argue that the goal in statistical anal-
ysis should be “to equalize the two [treated versus control] groups to 
make . . . the two groups as comparable as possible.”16  I agree.  But 
regression does not purport to make treatment and control groups 
comparable.  Instead, it attempts to account for systematic differences 
between the two groups via a mathematical model.  For this to work, 
the mathematical model has to have not just the treatment variable 
(race, gender, and so forth), but also all of the other variables, well 
specified, meaning the math has to be very close to the truth.  Part I of 
Causal Inference shows how easy it is to get the math wrong, and how 
badly things can go when that happens.17 
Plural makes much of the contention that implementation of the 
potential outcomes framework involves a model, perhaps a regression 
model.  Depending on how one defines the term “model,” this is not ac-
tually true, but grant the point for now.18  Causal Inference addressed 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  16  Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 57–58. 
  17  This distinction between attempting to make treated and control groups as comparable as 
possible, versus attempting to account for differences between the two groups via a mathematical 
model, is critical to causal inference.  The former should constitute the “design” phase of an ob-
servational study; the latter should take place in the “analysis” phase.  Potential outcomes sepa-
rates these two phases, placing primary importance on the former, which can and should be ac-
complished without access to the outcome variable.  Once the design phase has made the treated 
and control groups as comparable as possible, the analysis phase (which may or may not involve a 
stochastic model) can proceed.  If the design phase has worked properly, much less should turn on 
the technique employed in the analysis phase because when treated and control groups are com-
parable, different analysis techniques tend to give similar answers.  In this regard, one of the odd-
er passages of Plural is the accusation that I conflated the design and analysis phases of a statis-
tical analysis.  See Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 49–50.  A strength of the potential 
outcomes framework is the maxim “design before analysis,” meaning that in an observational 
study one should balance covariates by isolating subsets of comparable treated and control obser-
vations before analyzing outcomes.  Causal Inference made explicit the distinction between design 
and analysis, with the former illustrated by Figure 2, Greiner, supra note 2, at 567, and the latter 
illustrated by Figure 3, id. at 569.  The distinction is made particularly clear by noting that design 
can proceed without access to the outcome variable, while analysis cannot.  For more detail here, 
see Donald B. Rubin, For Objective Causal Inference, Design Trumps Analysis,  2 A NNALS 
APPLIED STAT. 808 (2008). 
   In contrast, regression as it is typically used in modern civil rights litigation does not at-
tempt the design phase, and thus does not attempt to make groups comparable.  Instead, every-
thing turns on an analysis model relating outcome to covariates and treatment.  This single-step 
approach requires a high degree of confidence that one can express the mathematical relationship 
among covariates, treatment, and outcome correctly.  Such confidence seems questionable when a 
statistician has the full range of specifications available, but it is particularly problematic when 
the statistician limits herself to models involving “a coefficient.” 
  18  Alexis Diamond and Professor Jasjeet S. Sekhon’s paper, Genetic Matching for Estimating 
Causal Effects: A General Multivariate Matching Method for Achieving Balance in Observational 
Studies (June 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://sekhon.berkeley.edu/papers/ 
GenMatch.pdf, cited in Causal Inference, Greiner, supra note 2, at 575 n.91, proposes a method of 
balancing without an explicit stochastic model.  Thus, one need not proceed by propensity scores 
and hypothesis testing, as is suggested by Plural, Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 53 & n.17.  
To be clear, however, the analyst typically must employ a one-dimensional distance measure that 
   
4  HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM  [Vol. 123:1 
this point head-on; the claim was that the process of making treated 
(for example, male) and control (for example, female) groups compara-
ble, a process called “balancing,” can and should be implemented 
without access to the outcome variable, allowing the analyst to make 
the judgment calls required in any statistical procedure without know-
ing what the results will be.  I have been unable to conceive of a better 
way to bolster analyst expert witness neutrality.  And bolstering neu-
trality seems particularly important in the litigation context, which 
provides powerful incentives for an expert to cherry-pick techniques 
that will favor the side that hired her, even subconsciously.19 
Plural’s principal response on this point is surprising: All is well 
with expert witness neutrality.  Everything is fine the way it is.  The 
“standard criteria used for assessing regression models” together with 
the adversary process are enough,20  so nothing new is needed.  I con-
fess that my strong sense that not all is well in the world of expert 
witnesses, that courts and litigators do perceive experts as advocates 
masquerading as witnesses (that is, whores21), is an impression based 
on my experience as a litigator, not a conclusion from a scientific sur-
vey.  Thus, I must leave it to readers to decide which is more persua-
sive, Dean Willborn and Professor Paetzold’s contention that the exist-
ing system does an adequate job of assuring expert witness neutrality, 
or my view that the system could use reform.22 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
allows comparison of how similar observations are to one another in their covariate vectors.   
Thus, I grant Dean Willborn and Professor Paetzold’s point here because this seems close enough 
to a “model” if the term is used loosely. 
  19  The references cited in Causal Inference, Greiner, supra note 2, at 544 n.33, include discus-
sions by highly ethical quantitative analysts, experienced expert witnesses, who report feeling the 
urge to produce an analysis favorable to “their” sides.  See Franklin M. Fisher, Statisticians, Eco-
nometricians, and Adversary Proceedings, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 277, 285–86 (1986); Joseph B. 
Kadane, Ethical Issues in Being an Expert Witness, 4 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 21 (2005). 
   The charge that I “minimize[]” the “role of expert judgment” when I discuss the potential 
outcomes approach, Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 52, is logically inconsistent with the 
charge that I overstate the benefits of proceeding with the design phase of an observational study 
without access to the outcome variable, Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 53–54.  It is precise-
ly because all applications of statistical techniques to data require the exercise of judgment that it 
is so important that this judgment be exercised blind to the results wherever possible.  If statistic-
al analysis were a rote and cookbook exercise, there would be no place for discretion, and thus 
investigator bias, to operate. 
  20  Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 54. 
  21  See J. Morgan Kousser, Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in Schol-
arship and Expert Witnessing, PUB. HISTORIAN, Winter 1984, at 5 (cited in Greiner, supra note 
2, at 544 n.31).  Note that dissatisfaction with expert witness neutrality goes back at least a cen-
tury and a half, as is colorfully documented in Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. 
REV. 1113, 1114–1116. 
  22  Plural also suggests that an opportunity for expert bias exists in deciding what variables are 
covariates.  See Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 54–55.  I demonstrate below that this con-
tention rests on confusion regarding exactly what variables are covariates as opposed to interme-
diate outcomes, confusion the potential outcomes framework does much to eliminate.   
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To summarize: Dean Willborn, Professor Paetzold, and I agree that 
we should insist on a definition of causal effect and that statistical 
analysis should proceed by making treated and control groups as com-
parable as possible.  The potential outcomes approach pursues these 
objectives explicitly and directly.  Regression as commonly used in 
modern civil rights litigation does not purport to pursue these objec-
tives at all.  Most of our disagreement stems from these points. 
II.  HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT 
CHARACTERIZING AND SELECTING VARIABLES? 
Causal Inference explained that a primary benefit of the potential 
outcomes framework is its insistence that the analyst specify a timing 
of treatment application, with the presumption in the civil rights con-
text23 being that treatment application occurs at the moment the per-
son or entity whose decisions we are attempting to assess first per-
ceives a unit’s sex, race, and so forth.  The focus on timing in turn 
facilitates separation of “covariates,” variables whose values are unaf-
fected by treatment, from intermediate outcomes, variables whose val-
ues are a function of treatment.  Covariates are the “background” var-
iables; in the running gender/salary example, we have to make men 
and women comparable on these background variables in order to iso-
late a gender effect.  If a variable’s value is set prior to the time that 
treatment is administered, then the potential outcomes framework tells 
us that the variable is a covariate.  The process of making treated and 
control groups comparable, discussed above, involves balancing covar-
iates, something an analyst can and must do.  Balancing a variable  
affected by treatment (called an “intermediate outcome”), in contrast, 
can result in the wrong answer, as Causal Inference makes clear using 
an example involving smoking, lung cancer, and death.24 
Dean Willborn and Professor Paetzold’s response on this subject 
demonstrates how much we need the guidance that the potential out-
comes framework provides.  They point out that in my gender discrim-
ination example, I use years of education as a covariate, reasoning that 
a unit’s years of education will typically have been set prior to the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  23  See Greiner, supra note 2, at 539 n.21 (clarifying that I am speaking of intentional discrimi-
nation, not disparate impact). 
  24  See id. at 564.  Again, a primary goal of the potential outcomes framework here (and more 
generally) is removal of bias.  Thus, the paradigm is not, as Plural would have it, “a statistical 
approach for reducing sources of variation.”  Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 49.  Plural’s 
confusion on this point mirrors Professor Paetzold’s suggestion in other work, that post-treatment 
variables be included in a regression so long as multicollinearity remains under control.  Lack of 
multicollinearity concerns variance, meaning a focus on avoiding inexact answers.  Avoiding post-
treatment bias involves a focus on avoiding wrong answers, inexact or not.  See Greiner, supra 
note 2, at 546–47, 547 n.40 (citing Ramona L. Paetzold, Multicollinearity and the Use of Regres-
sion Analyses in Discrimination Litigation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 207, 227 (1992)); id. at 564.   
6  HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM  [Vol. 123:1 
moment in which a firm first perceives an employee’s gender.25  They 
then contend that years of education might not really be a covariate 
because it “may be perceived or valued differently once the employer 
is aware of an employee’s race or gender,” and thus that “[d]istinguish-
ing covariates from intermediate outcomes is a complex and uncertain 
task.”26 
This discussion evidences substantial confusion that the potential 
outcomes framework clears up.27  The number of years of education is 
a covariate.  According to my hypothetical, employees finished school 
before applying for jobs at the firm.  Thus, the number of years of 
education each employee actually received was decided before the firm 
perceived whether the employee was male or female, and an analyst 
should “balance” on the variable by identifying groups of men and 
women with similar educational backgrounds for comparison.  In con-
trast, the abstract value an employer gives to each employee’s educa-
tional background is not a covariate; this value is assigned after the 
employer perceives each employee’s gender and, as Plural points out, 
may depend on gender.  Thus, an analyst should not try to “balance” 
on value-assigned-to-education-by-the-employer (assuming that could 
be measured) because doing so could mask discrimination at work.  If 
a firm values an additional year of education for a man more than for 
a woman, the firm is discriminating against women by valuing the 
same variable in a gender-specific way .  The idea here is the same as 
the one in the smoking, lung cancer, and death hypothetical mentioned 
earlier.  If, when deciding whether smoking kills, one attempts to “con-
trol for” or “balance” lung cancer incidence, then one will control or 
balance away deaths that smoking causes by means of lung cancer.  
That will make smoking look less deadly than it actually is.  Analogiz-
ing the two cases, being a woman is smoking; the actual number of 
years of education is something that predates the decision to smoke, 
such as a genetic predisposition to cancer; lung cancer is the value the 
firm places on years of education; and failure to hire is death.  The po-
tential outcomes framework beats a clear path.28 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  25  See Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 54. 
  26  Id. 
  27  The confusion stems from a failure to separate causal mechanism from causal effect.  See 
generally Paul W. Holland, Comment, Causal Mechanism or Causal Effect: Which Is Best for Sta-
tistical Science?, 3 STAT. SCI. 186 (1988). 
  28  To use another example from a well-known paper: Fictional resumes listing educational 
achievement can be sent to employers with randomly assigned names at the top, names designed 
to signal blackness or whiteness (they may also signal something else, but put that aside for now).  
In this situation, the educational achievement levels listed on the resumes are covariates, even 
though the employer may attach disparate value to the listed achievement according to whether 
the name at the top appears to belong to an African American or a Caucasian.  See Marianne 
Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jam-
al?  A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004).   
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More generally, Plural contends that I did not address how to “in-
corporate the full range of intermediate outcomes into the analysis.”29  
It is true that Causal Inference does not include a separate section on 
the subject, but the basics are there.  The first question is not how to 
incorporate intermediate outcomes into an analysis but whether to do 
so.  In my view, we may not always need to model all aspects of a 
causal mechanism or process to produce probative evidence regarding 
a causal effect.  To illustrate: Suppose in the gender and salary dis-
crimination example, we have access for each unit to measurements of 
all relevant covariates as well as to a subjective supervisor evaluation 
score.  Stipulate also that for present purposes this evaluation score 
could be affected by whether the worker is perceived as male or fe-
male (that is, it is an “intermediate outcome” in the terminology of 
Causal Inference and thus should not be part of the balancing 
process).30  Further, suppose that, after balancing on all the relevant 
covariates but not the evaluation score, statistical analysis suggests 
that men are receiving higher salaries than women in a way unlikely 
to be due to chance.  Is this, by itself, useful evidence?  Or does such 
evidence lack probative value unless and until we understand whether 
the firm is discriminating by assigning women lower evaluation scores, 
by undervaluing years of education for women, or by some other (un-
known) mechanism?  I suggest the former — that is, we do not need to 
understand the precise role played by every measured variable to pro-
duce probative evidence.  In a perfect world, it might be desirable to 
have such an understanding, in the sense that the statistical presenta-
tion may be more convincing if the analyst can explain exactly how 
the discrimination is occurring.  But tackling this question may in-
volve strong and unrealistic assumptions, and these can lessen the po-
tential power of evidence of statistically significant disparities (evi-
dence which is available in the absence of a complete understanding of 
mechanism).31 
Thus, in some situations, the wiser course may be not to incorpo-
rate intermediate outcomes into the analysis.  In other situations, how-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  29  Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 54. 
  30  In fact, the evaluation score may or may not be a covariate, depending on whose decisions 
are being examined as possibly discriminatory.  See Greiner, supra note 2, at 581–83 (discussing 
this “tug-of-war” problem).  I put this concern aside for now, but I do note that using regression 
does not allow an analyst to avoid the tug-of-war problem. 
  31  Note that if an analyst does decide to attempt to incorporate intermediate outcomes (such as 
subjective performance evaluations) into an analysis, the potential outcomes framework is flexible 
enough to allow the analysis to attempt to do so.  For a detailed and technical discussion of inter-
mediate outcomes in the potential outcomes framework, see Greiner, supra note 2, at 587 n.109 
(gathering sources).  These and subsequent articles refute Plural’s suggestion that “[t]he treatment 
of intermediate outcomes is less developed in the potential outcomes approach.”  Willborn & Paet-
zold, supra note 1, at 55.    
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ever, the analyst must incorporate them.  Causal Inference provides an 
example of this situation in the discussion of race and capital punish-
ment.  There, the causal effect of the perceived victim’s race on the 
jury’s death or life decision at the penalty phase of a capital trial was 
defined only for cases in which the (same) jury would have convicted 
for a death-eligible offense under both treatment and control (that is, 
victim-perceived-black and victim-perceived-white).  Thus, the analyst 
had to incorporate the intermediate outcome (conviction of a death-
eligible-offense) into the analysis.32  Otherwise, the analysts can mis-
take an effect of race on conviction for an effect of race on sentencing.  
Causal Inference demonstrated how to proceed here, suggesting that 
the analyst should focus on filling in the missing counterfactual values 
of the intermediate outcome before isolating those observations for 
which a causal effect is well defined, and proceeding with the analysis 
for these units. 
III.  ADDITIONAL POINTS 
Two additional minor points: First, Plural correctly points out that 
but-for causation is not the only relevant causal concept in civil rights 
litigation.33  True.  Causal Inference never argued otherwise.  My point 
was that the potential outcomes approach, with its focus on counter-
factuals, should feel familiar to those with legal training because of its 
resemblance to but-for causation.  Perhaps more importantly, the dis-
tinction between but-for causation versus substantial factor and other 
causation concepts often used in tort law will typically make little dif-
ference to a quantitative analyst.  Statistics requires data representing 
repetitive events (for example, a series of hiring decisions, or a set of 
capital punishment determinations).  When an analyst focuses on a set 
of repeated events as opposed to a single fact situation, a decision 
maker’s repeated use of an improper reason will ordinarily become in-
distinguishable from but-for causation. 
Second, Plural re-highlights what Causal Inference had explained 
in detail, that the process of “equaliz[ing treated and control] groups to 
make . . . the two groups as comparable as possible,”34 which all agree 
should occur, involves recognizing (in my gender discrimination exam-
ple) that for certain men, there are no comparable women, and vice 
versa.  As a litigator, I tip my hat to Dean Willborn and Professor 
Paetzold’s rhetorical flourish when they say that this process involves 
“discard[ing] some actual data on employees” and “creating a hypothet-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  32  See Greiner, supra note 2, at 583–88. 
  33  See Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 1, at 56. 
  34  Id. at 57–58.   
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ical set of data that is not the actual set of data,”35 but the argumenta-
tion threatens to obscure the truth.  The truth is that the data being 
“discarded” have no information; worse, they can be highly misleading 
in the absence of a near-perfect model.  If, for some men, there are no 
comparable women, what purpose is served by including these men in 
a statistical analysis focusing on gender?  In fact, including men with 
no relevant female counterparts is dangerous.  The running example in 
Causal Inference, particularly Figures 1-3 and accompanying text, ad-
dressed and illustrated precisely this point.36 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  35  Id. at 55. 
  36 See Greiner, supra note 2, at 551–53, 566–71. 